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Québec Labour Code and the Status 
of Unions and Collective Agreements' 
Jan K. Wanczycki 
The author in this article examines the status of unions 
and collective agreements under the new Québec Labour 
Code. He first présents a hrief historical review of the laws 
and décisions concerning this matter not only in Québec but 
also in the common lato provinces. He goes on stating the 
conditions prevailing in Québec as well as in the other 
provinces up to the enactment of the Code. He finally 
analyses the new provisions of the Labour Code governing 
the status of unions and collective agreements covered by it. 
PART I 
With the enactment of the Québec Labour Code * the question 
arises as to how the provisions of the Code affect the status of unions 
and collective agreements. Before the enactment of the Code the main 
provisions concerning thèse matters were contained in two Acts : The 
Labour Relations Act2 and in the Professional Syndicates' Act.3 
Under the Professional Syn-
dicates' Act a trade union could 
be incorporated by following the 
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* The views expressed in this paper are personal views of the author and should 
not be considered as representing in any way the views of the Department of 
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(1) 12-13 Eliz. II, Ch. 45, 1964. 
(2) R.S.Q. 1941, Ch. 162A (originally enacted in 1944). 
(3 ) R.S.Q. 1941, Ch. 162 (originally enacted in 1924). 
It should be noted that under the Collective Agrément Act (R.S.Q. 1941, 
Ch. 163) a joint committee formed to administer an extended collective agreement 
constitutes a corporation and has the powers, rights and privilèges of an ordinary 
civil corporation (S. 20 ) . However judicial personality contemplated by this Act 
is granted to such a committee only but not to the unions affected by the Act 
Society Brand Clothes Limited v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 
(1931) S.C.R. 321. 
237 
238 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 20, No. 2 
procédure outlined in the Act. In this respect Section 2(1) pro-
vides : 
S. 2 ( 1 ) . Twenty persons or more, Canadian citizens, engaged in the 
same profession, the same employment or in similar trades, or doing 
correlated work having for object the establishing of a determined 
product, may make and sign a mémorandum setting forth their 
intention of forming an association or professional syndicate. 
A trade union incorporated under this Act acquires, like any other 
corporation, a légal personality of its own, distinct from the member-
ship, with ail the rights and obligations granted by law to a légal entity. * 
A collective agreement concluded by an incorporated trade union 
under the Professional Syndicates' Act was meant to be a civil contract 
enforceable by the courts. This resulted from a définition of a collective 
agreement as contained in Section 21 of the Act and from Section 24 
regarding the effects of a collective agreement. 
Section 21 reads : 
S. 21 . The collective labour agreement is a contract respecting 
labour conditions made between the représentatives of a professional 
syndicate, or of a union, or of a fédération of syndicates, on the one 
hand, and one or more employers, or représentatives of a syndicate, 
union or fédération of syndicates of employers, on the other hand. 
Any agreement respecting the conditions of labour not prohibited 
by law may form the object of a collective labour agreement. 
Section 24 reads : 
S. 24. The collective labour agreement shall give rise to ail the rights 
and recourses established by the law for the enforcement of obliga-
tions 
The Professional Syndicates' Act, unlike the Labour Relations Act, 
contained in Section 22 spécifie provisions regarding the binding force 
of collective agreements. Those who were bound by the agreements 
were the unions and employers who were parties to the agreements and 
those employées who were union members or those who later joined the 
union. But agreements were not binding on those employées who were 
(4 ) In some respects a union incorporated under the Professional Syndicates' Act 
had more rights than other groups incorporated under the Act. Under S. 25 an 
incorporated union that is a party to a collective agreement could exercise ail rights 
of action arising out of such agreement in favour of each of their members, without 
having to establish a transfer of claim by the person interested, provided that the 
latter has been advised and has not declared that he was opposed thereto. This 
provision was included in the Act in spite of the principle contained in Art. 81 
of the Code of Civil Procédure that « A person cannot use the name of another 
to plead.., » 
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not members of the union which had signed the agreement or of a union 
which later joined in such an agreement. 
Section 22 reads : 
S. 22. The following shall be bound by the collective labour agree-
ment : 
1. The employées and employers who signed it either personally 
or by authorized attorney ; 
2. Those who, at the time the agreement was made, are members 
of a group, a party to the agreement, if, within eight clear days 
from the deposit hereinafter provided for in section 23 of this Act, 
they hâve not resigned from such goup and hâve not deposited a writt-
en notice in the office of the secretary of the group and with the 
Minister of Labour of the Province of Québec ; 
3. Those who are members of a group which later joins in such 
agreement, if, from the date of the notification of such adhésion, 
they hâve not withdrawn from the group in the manner and within 
the delay prescribed in the above paragraph 2 ; 
4. Those who, after the deposit of the agreement, join a group which 
was party to such agreement. 
The Professional Syndicates' Act did not contain any provision 
regarding settlement of disputes under collective agreement by grievance 
procédure or compulsory and binding arbitration. 
The approach of the Labour Relations Act to the status of trade 
unions and to that of collective agreements had been différent. The 
définition of a trade union, although it included a union incorporated 
under the Professional Syndicates' Act, essentially was concerned with 
trade unions as voluntary associations without légal status of their own. 
This was reflected in the définition of a union in section 2(d) of the Act 
which reads : 
5. 2(d) .—«Associat ion» includes a professional syndicate, a union 
of such syndicates, a group of employées or of employers, bona fide, 
having as object the régulation of relations between employers and 
employées and the study, defence and development of the économie, 
social and moral interests of its members, with respect of law and 
authority ; 
The purpose of including within this définition of unions also the 
unions incorporated under the Professional Syndicates* Act was appa-
rently to bring such unions within the scheme of certification and col-
lective bargaining without affecting the status of such incorporated 
unions and without affecting at first when the Act was passed in 1944 
240 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 20, No. 2 
the status of collective agreements and the enforcement of such agree-
ments as provided in the Professional Syndicates' Act. 
The approach of the Labour Relations Act to the status of collective 
agreements concluded by thèse bona fide voluntary associations of em-
ployées had been that a collective agreement is not a contract enforceable 
in the courts. In this respect the Act was similar to the British approach 
that a collective agreement should be placed in the category of a « gentle-
men's agreement » binding only as a matter of honour and supported by 
social rather than légal sanctions.5 The Labour Relations Act in Section 
2(e) defined a collective agreement as follows : 
S. 2 ( e ) « Collective Agreement » or « agreement » means any 
arrangement respecting conditions of employment entered into between 
persons acting for one or more associations of employées, and an 
employer or several employers or persons acting for one or more 
associations of employers ; 
A collective agreement under the Professional Syndicates' Act was 
meant to be a freely negotiated contract between the employer and the 
incorporated union and to be binding on only those employées who were 
members or later joined the union which signed the agreement. 
Under the Labour Relations Act a certified association of employées 
in an establishment or in a bargaining unit did not represent only those 
employées who belonged to that particular union (as was the case under 
the Professional Syndicates' Act) but such an association represented ail 
the employées in a bargaining unit. Further, the collective agreement 
was not any longer purely a voluntary act on the part of the employer. 
According to Section 4 of the Labour Relations Act, the employer was 
bound to recognize as the collective représentative of his employées the 
représentatives of any association comprising the absolute majority of 
his employées and to negotiate with them, in good faith, a collective 
agreement. Although the employer was not obliged to conclude a col-
lective agreement, his freedom to abstain from signing one was curtailed 
by the fact that the Act obliged him to negotiate in good faith and, if 
negotiations failed, he faced the possibility of a strike. 
(5) O. KAHN-FREUND, « The Common Denominator with Référence to Collective 
Bargaining in Europe », collected in « Lectures of the Law and Labour-Manage-
ment Relations» (University of Michigan Law School, 1951) referred to in B. 
Lepkin, « A study of the légal status of collective bargaining agreements in the 
common law provinces of Canada », in Papers presented at the armual meeting of 
the Canadian Bar Association, Banff, 1957, pp. 193-220. 
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The amendment to the Act in 19616 among others, in Section 24(4)7 
prohibited strikes and lockouts under any circumstances during the life 
of a collective agreement, and Section 24(5)8 provided for compulsory 
and binding arbitration of the disputes resulting from the interprétation 
and application of collective agreements. The arbitration procédure was 
determined either by the parties to the collective agreement or was 
imposed by the provisions of the Québec Trade Disputes Act (R.S.Q. 
1941, Ch. 167). 
Also the same amendment to the Labour Relations Act of 1961 in 
Section 24, subseotion 6 9 provided expressly that disputes other than 
those regarding the interprétation or application of collective agreements, 
that is, the so-called « interests » disputes, must be settled in the manner 
provided in the agreement and to the extent therein provided. 
The provision of Section 24 (5) and (6) meant that ail disputes during 
the life of a collective agreement, whether arising from interprétation 
and application of the agreement (disputes regarding « the rights »), or 
any other disputes (« interests » disputes) had to be settled in a manner 
provided in the collective agreement, and, in the case of disputes regard-
ing « rights », by way of compulsory and binding arbitration.10 The 
Labour Relations Act did not make any provision for settling the disputes 
in Courts. 
The only court action contemplated in the Act was a pénal prose-
cution under the Québec Summary Convictions Act for the breach of 
the provisions of the Act (Sections 42-50). In particular Section 44 
provided : 
(6) 1961 (9-10) Eliz. II, Ch. 73. 
(7) S. 24(4) Any strike or lockout is prohibited under any circumstances 
during the period of a collective agreement. 
(8) S. 24(5) Any complaint resulting from the interprétation or application 
of a collective agreement must be submitted to arbitration in the manner provided 
in the said agreement if it so provides, otherwise in the manner provided by the 
Québec Trade Disputes Act (Ch. 167). The report of the chairman of the council 
of arbitration shall constitute the award if a majority is lacking. In ail cases, the 
award shall bind the parties. 
(9) S. 24(6). No complaint other than those contemplated in the preceeding 
subsection shall be settled otherwise than in the manner provided in the collective 
agreement and to the extent therein provided. 
(10) Regarding the scope of the 1961 Amendments with regards to arbitration, 
see: R. CHARTIER, « Evolution de la Législation Québécoise du Travail — 1961 ». 
Relations Industrielles, Volume 16, No. 4, Oct. 1961, pages 381-426, at pp. 407-410. 
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S. 44. Any person who fails to comply with any obligation or pro-
hibition imposed by this act or by a régulation or décision of the 
Board is guilty of an offence and liable, unless another penalty is 
applicable, to a fine of not less than $100.00 nor more than $1,000.00 
for each day or portion of a day during which the offence continues. 
S. 49. Any pénal prosecution under this Act may be taken by the 
Board, or by any interested party with the written authorization of 
the Board or the consent of the Attorney General. 
Pénal sanctions under the Labour Relations Act could be invoked 
in connection with collective agreements if the party to the agreement 
did not comply with the provisions regarding the grievance procédure or 
when it refused to comply with the arbitration award. 
At one time the Québec Labour Relations Act and the Professional 
Syndicates Act drew a clear line of distinction regarding the nature of 
trade unions and the nature of collective agreements in Québec. A union 
had been a légal entity when incorporated under the Professional Syn-
dicates' Act and the collective agreement entered into by such an incor-
porated union was a civil contract under which rights and obligations 
could only be enforced by civil action in Courts. 
On the other hand, a trade union operating under the Labour Rel-
ations Act was essentially a voluntary bona fide association, and a col-
lective agreement concluded by such a union was not a civil contract. 
The Act did not contain any provision regarding the binding force of 
the collective agreements. Consequently, the rights and obligations 
acquired under the Labour Relations Act by a collective agreement were 
not to be enforced by the courts but rather by other means. " Finally 
the 1961 amendment spelled out that such disagreements had to be 
settled by grievance procédure and by compulsory and binding 
arbitration as provided in a collective agreement or in the Québec Trade 
(11) The collective agreements usually provided machinery for settling disputes, 
or the parties could take advantage of the arbitration procédure as provided in 
the Trade Disputes Act. 
In 1945 Section 17 was added to the Labour Relations Act which provided 
for grievance procédure with respect to any complaint regarding any alleged 
violations of the Act or of the collective agreement submitted by other association 
than that which was a party to a collective agreement when such an association 
comprises at least 20 employées, correspondu! g to at least 10 per cent of the group 
subject to a collective agreement. 
In 1958, M.-L. Beaulieu wrote that considering the fact that the Labour 
Relations Act does not contain any provision for settling disputes resulting from 
collective agreements by court actions — it is a controversial matter whether the 
courts hâve jurisdiction to settle such disputes. M.-L. BEAULIEU, « Contenu, effets 
juridiques, application et exécution de la convention collective dans la législation 
du Québec », La Revue du Barreau, 1958, t. 18, No. 2, pp. 53-66. 
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Disputes Act.12 Since then non-compliance with the grievance procé-
dure and arbitration / s . 24/5 and 6/ could lead to prosecution for an 
offence under the Act. 
This clear eut distinction insofar as the nature and enforcement of 
collective agreements was concerned partly disappeared when, in 1946, 
the Labour Relations Act amended by adding Section 19/a/13 which 
brought under the Labour Relations Act the collective agreements enter-
ed into under the Professional Syndicates' Act by the unions recognized 
by the Labour Relations Board as bargaining agents. 
Section 19 (a) reads : 
S 19(a). This Act shall apply to a collective agreement entered 
into under the Professional Syndicates' Act (ch. 162), by an asso-
ciation thus recognized, as from the date of the deposit of such 
agreement in the office of the Minister of Labour, in accordance 
with Sec. 23 of the said Professional Syndicates' Act ; such deposit 
shall dispense from this transmission contemplated in Sec. 19. The 
Minister shall transmit two certified copies of such agreement to the 
Board, for deposit in its archives. 
With the enactment of Section 19 / a / of the Labour Relations Act 
the provisions of the Professional Syndicates' Act regarding collective 
agreements ceased to apply to agreements entered into by incorporated 
unions and certified as bargaining agents by the Labour Relations Board. 
Such agreements ceased to be freely negotiated contracts enforced by 
civil actions and became agreements within the meaning of the Labour 
Relations Act which the employer was bound to negotiate in good faith. 
They acquired, like agreements negotiated by unincorporated unions 
this spécifie status of their own, not contracts but more than « gentle-
men's agreements », because of the spécifie way of enforcing them 
through grievance procédure with final and binding arbitration, and 
( 12 ) In a récent case VEcuyer et Autres v. Standard Téléphone and Cables Mfg. 
Co. et un Autre /1964/ R.J.C.S. Nos. 5 et 6, p. 339, Mr. Justice Smith of the 
Québec Superior Court held that a grievance resulting from the interprétation and 
application of a collective agreement under Section 24/5/ of the Labour Relations 
Act could only be submitted to arbitration as provided in the collective agreement 
in question and the resulting arbitration award was final and could not be changed. 
Further, he held that because of the provisions of the Labour Relations Act to the 
effect that an arbitration award under collective agreement is final and binding, 
such an award does not require homologation by the court under section 1431 and 
foll. of the Code of Civil Procédure in order that the bénéficiaires under the arbit-
ration award could sue the company for the money due to them. Further, the 
court held that such action could not be launched by the union, but only by the 
individuals concerned. 
(13) 10 Geo. VI, ch. 37, s. 2, 1946. 
244 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 20, No. 2 
through prosecutions in case of non-compliance with the provisions 
regarding the settlement of disputes under collective agreements. 
Section 19 / a / did not affect the légal status of incorporated unions, 
whether certified or not, but changed the nature and enforcement of 
collective agreements, once incorporated unions were certified as bar-
gaining agents. The application of Sections 21-26 of the Professional 
Syndicates' Act was narrowed down to collective agreements entered 
into by incorporated but not certified unions. 
Such agreements continued to be freely negotiated contracts (S. 21) 
with civil actions as the only means of enforcing them. 
Another Act in the province of Québec which caused controversy 
that it might affect the status of unincorporated trade unions was « An 
Act to facilitate the exercise of certain rights » of 1938 14 which was in 
1941 incorporated in Sections 28 and 29 of the Spécial Procédure Act 
—. Div. VIII — Summoning Unincorporated Groups.15 The provisions 
of the 1938 and 1941 Acts made it possible to bring court proceedings 
against the voluntary associations including unincorporated trade unions 
in their own name. Also thèse provisions made such an association, in 
case of action for damages, financially liable with ail its resources. This 
remedy was similar to the représentative action used against collective 
membership of a voluntary association in the common law provinces.16 
However, where the remedy of représentative action would be used in 
court proceedings by or against a voluntary association, the remedy 
provided in Québec was limited to the proceedings against a voluntary 
association only.17 
(14) 2 Geo. VI, Ch. 96, 1938. 
(15) R.S.Q. 1941, Ch. 342. 
S. 28. Every group of persons associated for the carrying out in common of 
any purpose or advantage of an industrial, commercial or professional nature in this 
Province, which does not possess therein a collective civil personality recognized 
by law and is not a partnership within the meaning of the Civil Code, is subjected 
to the provisions of Section 29 of this Act. 2 Geo. VI, Ch. 96, s. 1. 
S. 29. The summoning of such group before the courts of this Province, in 
any recourse provided by the laws of the Province, may be effected by summoning 
one of the ofïicers thereof at the ordinary or recognized office of such group or by 
summoning such group collectively under the name by which it désignâtes itself 
or is commonly designated or known. 
The summoning by either method contemplated in the preceding paragraph 
shall avaîl against ail the members of such group and the judgments rendered in 
the cause may be executed against ail the moveable or immoveable property of 
such group. 2 Geo. VI, c. 96, s. 2. 
(16) See SHERBANIUK, « Actions by and against trade unions in contract and tort », 
(1958), 12 U. of T.L.J. 151. 
(17) International Ladies Garment Workers Union, v. Rothman (1941) S;C.R. 388. 
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In 1960 the Québec Code of Civil Procédure was amended18 by 
repealing Division VIII of the Spécial Procédure Act and by incor-
porating its provisions in Section 81(a) and by adding 81(b) which pro-
vides that a voluntary association of employées within the meaning of 
the Labour Relations Act may plead in courts in its own name for the 
purposes of any recourse provided by the laws of the Province, by 
depositing in the court with the writ of summons or other proceedings 
introductive of suit, a certificate issued by the Québec Labour Relations 
Board that such a group constitutes a bona fide association within the 
meaning of the Labour Relations Act. Consequently since 1960 unin-
corporated trade unions in Québec may sue and be sued in their own 
name. 
The 1938 Act was enacted following the décision of the Suprême 
Court of Canada in Society Brand Clothes Ltd v. Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers of America19 where, with respect to the unincorporated trade 
unions in Québec, the Suprême Court of Canada held that such unions 
hâve no légal existence and cannot be considered in law as entities 
distinct from their individual members and are not suable in the common 
name. Mr. Justice Cannon, at page 328, stated : « the Province of 
Québec has not yet legislated to give légal existence to or recourse 
against unincorporated bodies. » 
The purpose of the 1938 Act was to provide such recourse against 
unincorporated unions. 
With the enactment of the 1938 Act two questions were raised : 
first, did the Act also provide the unions with the right to sue? And 
second, did the Act by implication endow trade unions with légal per-
sonality? 
About three years after its enactment, the 1938 Act was tested in the 
Suprême Court of Canada in the case of the International Ladies Gar-
ment Workers Union v. Rothman.20 In this case, an International Union 
contended that, since the enactment of Sections 28 and 29 of the Spécial 
Procédures Act21 which made an unincorporated union subject to 
(18) /1959-1960/ Ch. 99. 
(19) /1931/ S.C.R. 321. 
(20) (1941) S.C.R. 388. 
(21) R.S.Q. 1941, ch. 342. 
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summons collectively in its adopted name, the unincorporated union 
may likewise bring suit under that name. The Suprême Court rejected 
this contention and went on to déclare in the words of Mr. Justice Rinfret 
(later Chief Justice) (on page 393) that, from the précise and unam-
biguous words of the statute, read in their ordinary and natural sensé, 
« that statute allows the summoning of groups of the nature of the 
appellants before the courts of the province of Québec, either bjf 
summoning one of their officers, or by summoning the group col-
lectively under the name by which it is designated ; but it does not 
permit them to bring an action before the courts. The word «sum-
moning » is vvell knovvn in the procédure of the province and it 
connûtes the manner in which an action at law is brought against 
a défendant. The enactment is couched in express terms and does 
not admit of any possible doubt. » 
Regarding the effect of the statute on the status of the unincor-
porated unions, Mr. Justice Rinfret said (on pp. 393/94) : 
« The statute does not purport to incorporate the groups or persons 
therein described, nor does it purport to confer upon them a collective 
légal personality. It does exclusively what is therein stated : It allows 
persons who hâve claims against them to summon them in the name 
of one of their officers thereof, at the ordinary or recognized office 
of the group, or collectively under the name by which they are com-
monly designated or known. » 
It would seem that the décision of the Suprême Court of Canada 
in the Rothman case made clear that the 1938 Act did not affect the 
légal status of unincorporated trade unions in Québec. However when 
in 1945 Mr Justice Duranleau of the Québec Superior Court (an un-
reported judgment) in the Lachance v. La Fraternité de Wagonniers de 
Chemins de Fer d'Amérique 22 declared that the 1938 Act in substance 
provided merely for the summoning before the courts of certain 
groups of persons having no civil existence and that the purpose and 
ambit of the statute could not be extended into endowing unincorporate 
unions with légal entity, Mr. G. Favreau disagreed with this statement 
and argued that by inference S. 28 and 29 of the Spécial Procédure Act 
gave a « légal existence » and « corporate entity » to an unincorporated 
trade union.23 
In 1948, in the Québec court of appeal in the case of Comtois v. 
L'union Locale 1552 des Lambrisseurs de Navires,24 Mr. Justice Casey, 
rendering the judgment of the court expressed views similar to Mr. Fa-
vreau's when he stated (on p. 679) : 
(22) S.C.M. 232096, Feb. 26, 1945. 
(23) (1948) Canadien Bar Review, 584-590. 
(24) (1948) K.B. 671. 
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« Whatever may hâve been the position prior to the enacting of this 
statute, it is quite clear that when thèse proceedings were started 
any group of persons satisfying the requirements of art. 28 (as does 
the défendant union) could be summoned collectively and that the 
judgment rendered in the suit could be executed against the assets 
of the group. It cannot be denied therefore, that the statute gave to 
such groups generally, an existence separate and distinct from that 
of its individual members. 
This légal existence and this availability of assets, évidence the 
intention of the Législature that thèse groups should be as amenable 
to the Courts as any other artificial person, should one seek to exercise 
against them « any recourse provided by the laws of the Province ». 
This in my opinion is sufficient to make such a group subject to 
par. 2 of art. 992 C.P., and to expose it to the sanction of art. 1001 
of the same Code. » 
Mr. J.J. Spector disagreed25 with the views of Mr. Favreau and of 
Mr. Justice Casey and, relying on the décision of the Suprême Court of 
Canada in the Rothman case, supra, expressed the view that Art. 28 and 
29 of the Spécial Procédure Act did not give an unincorporated trade 
union an existence separate and distinct from that of its individual 
members. What the statutes purported to do, in his opinion, was to 
provide an easy method of exercising légal recourse against unincor-
porated associations by summoning ail members of the group through 
one of its officers or under its designated name. He concluded that it 
is not to be assumed that, because Secs. 28 and 29 of the Spécial Pro-
cédure Act gave légal recourse against unincorporated bodies, they like-
wise, by the same token, gave them légal existence. 
The effect of the 1938 Act on the status of trade unions was con-
sidered again in September 1953 by the Superior Court of Québec in 
MacDonald v. Tobin.26 Mr. Justice Jean rejected an application for 
injunction to remove a trusteeship imposed on the Teamsters' local 106 
in Montréal by the international président of the Teamsters' union, and 
to restore a former union officer, on the ground that Sec. 958, par. 2, of 
the Québec Code of Civil Procédure prohibits the granting of injunction 
to restrain exercise of any office in a public or private corporation. The 
plaintiff (former business agent of the union) claimed that Sec. 958 (2) 
was not applicable because the local in question was neither a public nor 
a private corporation and did not possess a légal personality distinct 
from its members. In rejecting this contention, Mr. Justice Jean (with 
référence to the judgment of the court of King's Bench in Comtois v. 
(25) (1949) Canadian Bar Review, 217-224. 
(26) (1954) C.S.RJ. 65. 
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L'union Locale 1552 des Lambrisseurs de Navires, supra) held that, since 
the adoption of the 1938 « Act to facilitate the exercise of certain right » 
(as incorporated in Secs. 28 and 29 of the Spécial Procédure Act, R.S.Q. 
1941, Ch. 342), it has been recognized that associations of persons formed 
with a view to achieving some common industrial, commercial or pro-
fessional purposes, in the province, hâve a légal personality distinct 
from their members. And the holding of an office in one of such asso-
ciations is similar to the holding of an office in a public or private 
corporation. 
In 1959, in the case of Perreault v. Poirier and Dresscutters' union, 
Local 205, 262, the Québec Court of Queen's Bench 27, relying on the 
Suprême Court of Canada décisions in Society Brand Clothes Ltd. v. 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America2S and International Ladies 
Garment Workers Union v. Rothman,29 confirmed the décision of the 
trial court and upheld the position that, in Québec, voluntary associ-
ations including unincorporated unions, had no légal entity and eonse-
quently are unable to sue. The rulings of the Québec courts were 
confirmed by the Suprême Court of Canada.80 In this case the 1938 
Act was not directly involved and no argument was presented that the 
1938 Act might hâve endowed the voluntary associations including 
unincorporated unions, with légal entity thus giving them the right to 
sue. The décision in the Perreault case was followed in 1960 by inclusion 
of the Spécial Procédure Act in the Code of Civil Procédure as Art. 81 (a) 
and by adding Art. 81 (b) which enabled unincorporated unions to sue 
(1959-60) ch. 99). 
If any controversy still exists regarding the effect of the 1938 Act 
on the légal status of unincorporated unions, it is submitted that the 
Suprême Court of Canada décisions in the Rothman case and by impli-
cation in the Perreault case, should be décisive. While the 1938 Act 
and the 1960 amendment to the Code of Civil Procédure provided a 
procédural device to bring actions by or against unincorporated unions 
in their name, thèse statutes did not affect the position of unincorporated 
unions as being voluntary associations without a légal personality of 
their own, 
(27) (1959) R.J.B.R. 447. 
(28) (1931) S.C.R. 321. 
(29) (1941) S.C.R. 388. 
(30) (1959) S.C.R. 843. 
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PART II 
When considering the status of trade unions and that of collective 
agreements in Québec on the eve of the introduction in 1963 of the Code 
of Labour (Bill 54), it might be useful to describe briefly the common 
law approach and the approach of labour législation in the common law 
provinces regarding the same matters. 
The légal status of trade unions at common law was clearly stated 
by Mr. Justice Cannon in Society Brand Clothes Ltd. v. Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers of America31 when he said (at pp. 327-328): 
We must accordingly reach the conclusion that, while under the 
prevailing policy, our législation gives to unincorporated labour organ-
izations a large measure of protection, they hâve no légal existence ; 
they are not endowed with any distinct personality ; they hâve no 
corporate entity ; they constitute merely collectivities of persons. The 
acts of such an association are only the acts of its members. There-
fore, it cannot appear before the courts and its ofRcers hâve no 
capacity to represent it before the tribunals of the province of 
Québec where «nu l ne plaide au nom d'autrui » (Art. 81, C.C.P. ). 
The conclusion reached by the majority of the court was summed 
up in the headnote (at p. 321): 
An unincorporated labour union has no légal existence and cannot 
be considered in law an entity distinct from its individual members 
and is not suable in the common name. 
This was quoted with approval by Mr. Justice Rinfret in the judg-
ment of the Suprême Court of Canada in the International Ladies 
Garment Workers Union v. Rothman.32 
Regarding the status of collective agreements at common law, the 
décision of the Privy Council in Young v. Canadian Northern Railway 
Company88 had been held as authority for the principle that a collective 
agreement is not a contract enforceable in courts. 
The législation concerning labour-management relations in the 
fédéral fîeld of jurisdiction and in the common law provinces that 
emerged in the years following World War II continued the long 
standing common law position that trade unions are voluntary associa-
(31) (1931) S.C.R. 321. 
(32) (1941) S.C.R. 388. 
(33) (1931) A.C. 83. 
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tions of physical persons without a légal personality of their own and 
that collective agreements are rather in the nature of « gentlemen's 
agreements » and not contracts enforceable in courts. Thèse views were 
reflected in the définition of trade unions which may difiFer slightly from 
one jurisdiction to another but essentially describe a trade union as an 
organization of employées formed for the purpose of regulating relations 
between employers and employées, and in the définition of collective 
agreements as agreements between the employers and trade unions 
acting as bargaining agents, containing terms or conditions of employ-
ment including provisions with référence to rates of pay and hours of 
work.34 
As to stress the common law approach to the status of trade unions 
and to the status of collective agreements spécifie provisions to endow 
trade unions and collective agreements with immunity from court action 
with regard to suing the unions and enforcing agreements through 
civil actions had been inserted in the Ontario Rights of Labour Act 
(ss. 3(2) and 3(3)35 and in the Saskatchewan Trade Union Act in Sec-
tions 23 and 24.36 Also the Newfoundland Trade Union Act37 (replaced 
in 1960) provided in S. 6 that « An action against a trade union or against 
any member or officiai thereof on behalf of themselves and ail other 
members of the union in respect of any tortious act alleged to hâve been 
(34) For example the fédéral Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act 
defines trade unions in S. 2(1) (r) as foliows : « Trade union » or « union » means 
any organization of employées formed for the purpose of regulating relations bet-
ween employers and employées but shall not include an employer-dominated 
oganization. 
And in Section 2 ( l ) ( d ) describes a collective agreement: «-collective 
agreement » means an agreement in writing between an employer or an employers' 
organization acting on behalf of an employer, on the one hand, and a bargaining 
agent of his employées, on behalf of the employées, on the other hand, containing 
terms or conditions of employment of employées including provisions with référence 
to rates of pay and hours of work. 
(35) R.S.O. 1960, Ch. 354. 
S. 3 ( 2 ) A trade union shall not be made a party to any action in any court 
unless it may be so made a party irrespective of any of the provisions of this Act 
or of The Labour Relations Act. 
S. 3 ( 3 ) A collective bargaining agreement shal not be the subject of any 
action in any court unless it may be the subject of such action irrespective of any 
of the provisions of this Act or of The Labour Relations Act. 
(36) R.S.S. 1953, Ch. 259. 
S. 23. A trade union shall not be made a party to any action in any court 
unless such trade union may be made a party irrespective of any of the provisions 
of this Act. 
S. 24 A collective bargaining agreement shall not be the subject of any 
action in any court unless such collective bargaining agreement might be the 
subject of such action irrespective of any of the provisions of this Act. 
(37) R.S.N. 1952, Ch. 262. 
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committed by or on behalf of the trade union shall not be entertained 
by any court. » 
At the same time with regard to the status of trade unions some 
statutes made provisions granting the unions légal personality that they 
might be prosecuted in their own name for offences committed under 
the Act.38 
It was left to the courts to clarify whether the provisions of the 
Labour Relations Act making the unions subject to prosecutions in 
their own name as légal persons for breach of the Act, would by implic-
ation allow the unions as légal persons to initiate prosecutions or other 
légal proceedings in courts. The courts ruled that in view of the clear 
language of thèse provisions, such an implication was not acceptable.39 
As the resuit of the position taken by the courts, Section 46(1) of the 
Manitoba Act, which was identical with the fédéral provision, was 
amended in 1959 40 to empower unions to initiate prosecutions, and in 
a similar way the New Brunswick Labour Relations Act was amended 
in 1961.41 
In most jurisdictions labour législation was silent as to whether 
unions were able to sue or be sued in their names as légal persons. It 
was assumed that, trade unions being unincorporated associations at 
common law, the only way open to them to sue or be sued was by way 
of représentative action. Considering procédural difficulties and un-
certainties of représentative action particularly in actions for damages 
against the unions 42, in several instances court proceedings were brought 
(38) In this respect Section 45 of the I.R.D.I. Act reads : 
S. 4 5 ( 1 ) . A prosecution for an offence under this Act may be brought 
against an employers' organization or a trade union and in the name of the organiz-
ation or union and for the purpose of such a prosecution a trade union or an 
employers' organization shall be deemed to be a person, and any act or thing done 
or omitted by an officer or agent of an employers' organization or trade union 
within the scope of his authority to act on behalf of the organization or union 
shall be deemed to be an act or thing done or omitted by the employers* organ-
ization or trade union. 
Similar provisions were contained in the Labour Relations Acts of Manitoba, 
New Bunswick, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia. 
(39) See Canadian Seamens Union v. Canadian Labour Relations Board and 
Branch Lines Ltd., ( 1951 ) 2 D.L.R. 356 ; Re Walterson and Laundry and Dry 
Clearing Workers Union and New Method Launderers Limited ( 1955 ) 14 W.W.R. 
541 ; The Queen v. Labour Relations Board, ex Parte Steeves Motors Ltd. and 
Attorney-General of New Brunswick (1959) 17 D.L.R. ( 2 d ) , p . 268. 
(40) 1959 (2nd Sess., Ch. 32 ) . 
(41) (1960-61) Ch. 52. 
(42) See SHERBANTUK, ibid., footnote 16. 
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by or against the unions in their names and the courts had to décide 
whether within the context of labour législation (or at common law) the 
unions had status to appear in courts in their own names. 
In some cases the courts held that the unions as such hâve no légal 
status to appear in courts.43 
In several cases however the courts held or accepted the unions as 
légal entities.44 Three décisions in this respect are of particular im-
portance. 
In Re Patterson and Nanaimo Dry Cleaning and Laundry Workers 
Union, Local 1 4 5 (a case primarily concerned with the prosecution of a 
union in its name as a légal entity for breach of the B.C. Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act), the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
ruled that an unregistered and unincorporated trade union but certified 
as a bargaining agent under the British Columbia Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act, 1947, (B.C.) Ch. 44, (replaced in 1954 by the Labour 
Relations Act), has been endowed by the Législature by the terms of the 
Act with status, attributes and responsibilities of a juridical person for 
(43) Clay Product Workers' Union v. Dominion F ire Brick and Clay Products 
Ltd. and Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan ( 1947 ) 1 D.L.R. 376 ; Orchard 
v. Tunney (1957) 8 D.L.R. (2d), p. 273 ; Charleston et al and Lodges Nos. 519, 
51 and 558 of Brotherhood of Raitroad Trainmen v. MacGregor and Brotherhood 
of Railroad Trainmen ( 1957 ) 23 W.W.R. 353 ; J.A. Nabess and Lynn Lake Base 
Métal Workers Fédéral Union No. 292 and Sherritt Gordon Mines Ltd. (1960) 
67 Man. R. 22 ; C.C.H. Canadian Law Reporter, para. 15, 310 ; Re James Warner 
and the Manitoba Labour Board et al, (1960) 31 W.W.R. 613; Re Bakery and 
Confectionary Workers' Interntional Union of America Local 389, Winnipeg, and 
Brothers Bakery Ltd. ( 1962 ) 37 W.W.R. 413. 
(44) Hollywood Théâtres Ltd. v. Tenney (1940) 1 D.L.R. 452; Mackay and 
Mackay v. International Association of Machinists, Lodge No. 1057, Saskatoon 
(1946) 3 D.L.R. 38; Re Patterson and Nanaimo Dry Cleaning and Laundry 
Workers Union, Local No. 1 (1947) 4 D.L.R. 159; Medalta Potteries Limited v. 
Longridge ( 1947 ) 2 W.W.R. 856 ; Vancouver Machinery Depot Ltd. v. United 
Steelworkers of America (1948) 1 D.L.R. 114; (1948) 4 D.L.R. 518; (1948) 
4 D.L.R. 522 ; Re International Nickel Co. of Canada Ltd., Shedden v. Kopinak 
(1950) 1 D.L.R. 381 ; The Manitoba Labour Relations Act ; re International Union 
of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 827, and Manitoba Labour Board ( 1952 ) 
5 W.W.R. (NS) 264; Walker v. Billingsley (1952) 4 D.L.R. 490; Peerless Laundry 
and Cleaners Ltd. v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Workers Union (1952) 5 W.W.R. 
(NS) 264; Walker v. Bïllingshy (1952) 4 D.L.R. 490; Peerless Laundry and 
Cleaners Ltd. v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Workers Union (1952) 6 W.W.R. 
( NS ) 443 ; Machinists, Fitters and Helpers Unions, Local No. 3 v. Victoria Machin-
ery Depot Co. Ltd. (1953) 3 D.L.R. 414; G.H. Wheaton Ltd. v. Local 1598, 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (1957), 6 D.L.R. (2d) 
500 ; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and 
Helpers, Building Material, Construction and Fuel Truck Drivers, Local No. 213 
v. Henry Therien (1960) 22 D.L.R. (2d) p. 1; (1960) S.C.R. 265. 
(45) (1947) 4 D.L.R. 159. 
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the purposes of the Act and proceedings thereunder. In Vancouver 
Machinery Depot Ltd., v. United Steel Workers of America, the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal48 held that a union not actually certified as 
a bargaining agent but capable of being so certified under the Act was 
a suable entity (persona juridica) for the purposes of implementing that 
Act and for causes of action that might possible be founded directly 
upon its provisions or breaches thereof. On appeal47 this ruling was 
confirmed and Mr. Justice Sidney Smith added : 
The status of unions — either as local or international bodies — to be 
sued in contract or tort, has not, however, been determined as yet 
by this Court. 48 
This last aspect of légal status had been considered by the Suprême 
Court of Canada in the case of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Local No. 213 v. Henry Therien40 when the court held that a trade union 
coming within the définition of that expression in the Labour Relations 
Act, 1954 (B.C.) Ch. 17, and particularly if it has been certified under 
the Act as a collective bargaining agent, is a légal entity not only for 
the purposes of the Labour Relations Act but under the common law 
and may be held liable in its name for damages either for a breach of a 
provision of the Labour Relations Act or under the common law (liability 
in contract or in tort). 
In some décisions that followed this judgment, the courts held that 
the prnciple established in the Therien case was applicable to trade 
unions under labour législation in Manitoba, Ontario and under the 
fédéral I.R.D.I. Act.50 
Some provinces did not lag behind the évolution of the common 
law. For example in British Columbia before the Suprême Court of 
Canada décision in the Therien case was rendered, a new Trade-unions 
Act was enacted in 195951 which stated in S. 7 that a trade union (and 
(46) (1948) 4 D.L.R. 518. 
(47) (1948) 4 D.L.R. 522. 
(48) Ibid., p. 524. 
(49) (1960) 22 D.L.R. (2d) p. 1 ; (1960) S.C.R. 265. 
(50) Dusessoy's Supermarkets St. James Ltd. v. Retail Clerks Union Local No 832 
( 1961 ) 34 W.W.R. 577 ; Boldt v. Seafarers* International Union of North America, 
Canadian District (1961) 26 D.L.R. (2d) 678; Re Polymer Corporation and OU, 
Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 16-14 (1961) 26 D.L.R. 
(2d) 609; (1961) 28 D.L.R. (2d) 8 1 ; (1962) 33 D.L.R. (2d) 124; Nipissing 
Hôtel Ltd. v. Hôtel and Restaurant Employées and Bartenders International Union 
(1963) 38 D.L.R. (2d) 675. 
(51) (1959) Ch. 90, s. 1 ; R.S.B.C. 1960, Ch. 384. 
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an employers' organization) is a légal entity « for purposes of prosecuting 
and being prosecuted for offences against the Labour Relations Act and 
for purposes of suing and being sued under this Aet. » In Manitoba, the 
Labour Relations Act which provides in S. 46 as amended in 1959 for 
prosecutions by or against the unions (or employers' organizations) as 
légal entities for an offence under the Act, was amended again in 1962.52 
A new Section 46A was added which made unions liable for daimages 
resulting from doing anything prohibited or required to be done under 
the Act. Subsection (3) stated : « For the purposes of suing or being 
sued as permitted under this Act, employers' organizations and trade 
unions are légal entities capable of suing or being sued ». 
In Newfoundland, the Labour Relations Act53 as enacted in 1950 
provided in S. 46(1) for prosecution of trade unions in their name for an 
offence under the Act and for such purpose the union was declared to 
be a person. In 1960 the amendment54 to the Act provided by adding 
a new S. 25A for a union's liability in damages for tortious act committed 
in connection with légal strikes. The new Trade Union Act enacted in 
196055 provided in Section 5(5) that ail actions, suits, prosecutions, and 
complaints taken by or against a union in any court of compétent juris-
diction concerning the property of a union registered under the Act 
shall be taken in the name of the trustées, and « ail other actions by and 
against a union registered under this Act shall be taken in the name of 
the union ». Regarding unregistered unions subsection 7 of section 5 
provided that « a union which has not been registered may be sued in 
its own name or in the name of any of its members ». 
In Prince Edward Island the Trade Union Act of 194566 was replac-
ed in 1962 by the Industrial Relations Act.57 Section 52 of the Act con-
tains provisions regarding the status and civil liability of trade unions 
similar to section 18 of the former Act as amended in 1953 (2nd Sess. 
Ch. 3, s. 1). Section 52 reads : 
A trade union may sue and be sued by its name as fîled under 
Section 50, and if not so filed, then by the name by which it is 
commonly known. 
(52) (1962) Ch. 35, s. 15. 
(53) R.S.N. 1952, Ch. 258. 
(54) 1960, No. 58, s. 17. 
(55) 1960, No. 59. 
(56) R.S.P.E.I. 1951, Ch. 164. 
(57) 1962, Ch. 18. 
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As to the status of collective agreements, as already mentioned, the 
définition of the collective agreement in the Labour Relations Acts 
embodied the common law position that collective agreements are rather 
in the nature of the « gentlemen's agreements », of a code of behaviour, 
and not contracts enforceable in courts. But at the same time provisions 
were made that once a union was certified as a bargaining agent for a 
unit of employées, the employer was bound to bargain in good faith in 
view of concluding an agreement. 
If and when a collective agreement was concluded, labour lég-
islation provided two ways of enforcing such an agreement. Provisions 
were made that the grievances resulting from interprétation, application 
and violation of collective agreements had to be settled through a 
grievance procédure by arbitration (or otherwise) without stoppage of 
work as provided in the agreements or in the Acts. Such settlement 
was final and binding on every party to and every person bound by the 
agreement. Non-compliance with arbitration award would constitute 
an offence under the Act and lead to prosecution under the Act. 
Sections 19 of the fédéral I.R.D.I. Act provided : 
S. 19(1) Every collective agreement entered into after the lst day 
of September, 1948, shall contain a provision for final 
settlement without stoppage of work, by arbitration or 
otherwise, of ail différences between the parties to or per-
sons bound by the agreement or on whose behalf it was 
entered into, concerning its meaning or violation. 
(3) Every party to and every person bound by the agreement, 
and every person on whose behalf the agreement was 
entered into, shall comply with the provision for final 
settlement contained in the agreement and give effect 
thereto. 
Also provisions were made that a collective agreement is binding 
on the parties to the collective agreement as well as on the employées 
to whom the agreement applied. A breach of the collective agreement 
could be prosecuted as an offence under the Act. For instance the 
British Columbia Labour Relations Act (R.S.B.C. 1960, Ch. 205) provides 
in this respect : 
S. 20 A collective agreement is binding upon 
a) the trade-union which has entered into the agreement and 
every employée covered by the agreement ; and 
b) the employer who has entered into the agreement, or an 
employers' organization authorized by the employer which 
has entered into the agreement, 
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S. 21(1) Every person vvho is bound by a collective agreement, 
whether entered into before or after the coming into force 
of this Act, shall do everything he is required to do, and 
shall refrain from doing anything that lie is required to 
refrain from doing, by the provisions of the collective 
agreement, and failure to so do or refrain from so doing 
is an offence against this Act. 
It may be assumed that within the context of the provisions of the 
Act regarding the final settlement of différences under collective agree-
ment and the provisions regarding prosecution for breach of an agree-
ment as an offence under the Act, recourse to prosecutions under the 
Act would hâve to be preceeded by an arbitration award stating a 
breach of the collective agreement, unless the breach was self-evident 
for example in case of a union calling a strike in breach of collective 
agreements has been strengthened. They became the focal point of the 
the Act dealing with strikes and lockouts and could be prosecuted as 
offences under the Act or enjoined without recourse to grievance pro-
cédure. 
As the resuit of thèse statutory provisions the position of collective 
agreements has been strengthened. They became the focal point of the 
whole process of collective bargaining. Protected by law, enforced by 
way of grievance procédure with compulsory and binding arbitration 
which could lead to prosecutions for breach of the provisions of the 
labour relations Acts, collective agreements acquired a spécifie status 
of their own. They became more than « gentlemen's agreements ». 
However statutory provisions stopped short of making them civil 
contracte. 
This situation led Mr. Justice Wilson of the Suprême Court of 
British Columbia in the case of Hume and Rumble 5S to the statement 
that the ratio decidendi in the décision of the Privy Council in Young v. 
agreement has no légal status in courts and is not a contract enforceable 
Canadian Northern Railway Company59 to the effect that a collective 
(58) Hume and Rumble Limited and Peterson Electrical Construction Company 
Limited v. Local 213 of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (1954) 
12 W.W.R. (NS) 321. This was the case vvhere the plaintiff companies sued for a 
déclaration that certain letters exchanged between the companies and the union 
constituted a binding agreement to enter into a collective agreement, and for a 
déclaration as to the terms of the collective agreement and for an order that the 
union sign and exécute the said collective agreement (headnote) . 
(59) (1931) A.C 8 3 ; (1931) 1 W.W.R. 49. 
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in the courts, is not capable of gênerai application to ail collective 
agreements between employers and trade unions. 
Mr. Justice Wilson referred to the Industrial Conciliation and Ar-
bitration Act, R.S.B.C. 1948, Ch. 155, which in Section 44 provided 
that a collective agreement is binding on the bargaining agent, every 
employée in the bargaining unit and the employer who has entered into 
the agreement, and in Section 45 that breach of the agreement is an 
offence under the Aot. 
Then Mr. Justice Wilson added : 
. . . if, when Young v. C.N.R., supra, was decided, their lordships 
of the Privy Council had had before them a provision similar to 
Section 45 I very much doubt that they would hâve arrived at the 
conclusion they did reach. (p . 328) 
. . . if the collective agreement is declared by me to be in effect, 
they (the plaintiffs) will hâve a right arising ex contracta and 
enforceable in this court. 
. . . The existence of a collective agreement confers on either other 
party valuable rights. It assures employers, such as the plaintiffs, 
industrial peace for the term of the agreement. This peace is gua-
ranteed by the terms of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act (and, as I hâve said, no such Act was under considération in 
Young v. C.N.R.) which provides penalties for any breach of a col-
lective agreement by the union or its members. (p. 329) 
In récent years the arbitration boards chaired by Professor B. 
Laskin60 held that the labour unions are légal entities; that for arbitration 
purposes a collective agreement is a contract; and, that the unions* 
responsibility for the conduct of their members (or of the employées in 
the bargaining unit) is a contractual obligation undertaken by the union 
towards the employer in a collective agreement. Consequently, the 
boards ruled that arbitration boards hâve the power to award damages 
for breach of collective agreements even if such powers were not spe-
cifically stated in such agreements. 
One of thèse awards which granted damages against the union for 
breach of collective agreement because of a wildcat strike in a dispute 
(60) United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, Local 514, 
în re Amalgamated Electric Corporation, Nov. 30, 1949 and May 8, 1950 (Labour 
Arbitration Cases, vol. 2, pp. 591-597 and pp. 597-608). Canadian General Electric 
Co. Ltd., in re United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, Local 
507, Jan. 8, 1951 and June 19, 1952 ( Labour Arbitration Cases, vol. 2, pp. 608-615, 
and vol. 3, pp. 1090-1096). Re OU Chemical and Atomic Workers and Polymer 
Corp. Ltd., Sept. 4, 1958 and Nov. 10, 1959 (Labour Arbitration Cases, vol. 10, 
1960, pp. 31-51 and pp. 51-65). 
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between Polymer Corporation and Local 16-14 of the Oil, Chemical and 
Atomic Workers International Union, was challenged in courts 6l and 
the décision of the arbitration board was upheld. 
Chief Justice McRuer of the Ontario High Court ruled that a union 
whose labour management relations were governed by the Fédéral 
Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act had the capacity to 
incur liability as a légal entity for damages and it was within the power 
of the board of arbitration set up under collective agreement to award 
and assess damages for breach of a no-strike clause of collective; agree-
ment. The court ruled that the arbitration board constituted under the 
grievance procédure as provided under the collective agreement had 
power to award damages for breach of the terms of the collective agree-
ment even though such power was not expressly stated therein. Regard-
ing the question whether the union is a légal entity under the Fédéral 
I.R.D.I. Act and as such liable for damages, Chief Justice McRuer held 
that the principle of law regarding the légal entity of a union as applied 
by the Suprême Court of Canada in the Therien case should apply to the 
union under the I.R.D.I. Act. Also, he held that when the Parliament 
of Canada provided in the I.R.D.I. Act for certification of a union with 
power to compel an employer to bargain with it and when it clothed the 
union with power to enter into a « collective agreement » with an em-
ployer, it invested the trade union with those corporate characteristics 
essential to a capacity to contract within the scope of the purposes of the 
Act. That being so, he added it necessarily follows from the Therien 
case that, since the trade union has a légal capacity to enter into a 
collective agreement, Parliament has imposed on it the responsibility 
that flows from a breach of the agreement. 
Comparing the collective agreement under considération with an 
ordinary commercial contract, Chief Justice McRuer noted that if the 
collective agreement was an ordinary commercial contract, any dispute 
regarding the alleged violation of the agreement would be the proper 
subject of arbitration and the question as to whether a party who had 
broken a term of the contract should pay damages and in what amount, 
would be such a dispute. However, he stressed that a collective agree-
ment is différent in some aspects from an ordinary commercial contract. 
It is not that sort of contract that can be terminated by répudiation by 
(61) Re Polymer Corporation and OU, Chemical Atomic Workers International 
Union, Local 16-14, (1961) 26 D.L.R. (2d) 609; (1961) 28 D.L.R. (2d) 8 1 ; 
(1962) 33 D.L.R. (2d) 124; 
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one party merely because the other party has broken one of its terms62 
because under the I.R.D.I. Act « ail différences between the parties » 
must be settled without stoppage of work. In his opinion this aspect of 
the matter raises a stronger inference that the matter of damages for 
breach of the collective agreement should be assessed by the board of 
arbitration than in the case of a mère commercial contract. 
The judgment of Chief Justice McRuer was upheld by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal and eventually the Suprême Court of Canada. During 
the hearing before the Suprême Court of Canada (on November 20, 
1961) the question of the nature of collective agreement was raised. 
Counsel for the union argued to the effect that a collective agreement 
is in the nature of a code of behaviour and not a contract. On the other 
hand counsel for the company argued that a collective agreement under 
sec. 18 of the I.R.D.I. Act is a contract. The judment of the Suprême 
Court did not deal with this issue in particular, but by upholding the 
judgment of Chief Justice McRuer in its entirety, the court by implication 
rejected the union's argument that a collective agreement is rather in 
nature of a code of behaviour than a contract. 
A significant indication of the présent trend of thought in connection 
with the nature of collective agreement in the common law provinces is 
the 1962 amendment to the Manitoba Labour Relations Act63 which 
states in section 46A, subsection 2, under a headnote « Breach of con-
tract » : 
A party to a collective agreement or any employer, employers' organ-
ization, or a trade union, that is bound by a collective agreement, 
who or which is in breach thereof, is liable for gênerai or spécial 
damages, or both, and may be sued by any other party thereto or 
person bound thereby who is injured or suffers damage as a resuit 
of the breach. 
Subsection 3 of Section 46A links this status of a collective agree-
ment as a contract with the status of trade unions as légal entities for 
the purposes of civil actions by stating : 
(62) In contrast to this view it should be noted that in Shipping Fédération of 
British Columbia and International Longshoremen's and Warehowemens Union 
(1959), C.C.H. Canadian Labour Law Reporter, para. 15, 277, the court found 
that the arbitration board did not err in deciding the question of law that a 
breach of an essential clause in a collective agreement discharged the union from 
further performance of its contractual duties towards the employer (the case re-
ferred to in Carrothers, Labour Arbitration in Canada (1961), pp. 66-67. 
(63) S.M. 1962, Ch. 35, s. 15. 
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For the purposes of suing or being sued as permitted under this Act, 
employers' organizations and trade unions are légal entities capable 
of suing or being sued. 
It may be added that the amendment in question provides in Sub-
section 1 for gênerai liability for damage for breach of the Act (which 
by implication would include also liability for breach of collective agree-
ment in subsection 2) in the following terms : 
S. 46A(1) Any employers' organization, trade union, employer, em-
ployée, or person who, 
( a ) does, or authorizes, or aids or abets the doing of 
anything prohibited under this Act ; or 
( b ) fails to do anything required to be done under this; 
Act ; or 
(c ) authorizes, or aids or abets in the failure to do any-
thing required to be done under this Act ; 
is liable for gênerai or spécial damages, or both, to 
anyone who is injured or sufïers damage by the act or 
failure. 
The provisions of the 1959 British Columbia Trade-unions Act (1959 
Ch. 90, s. 1) provide in S. 4 that an employers' organization, trade union, 
or other person who does, authorizes or concurs in anything prohibited 
by the Labour Relations Act or fails to do anything required by the Act, 
or in case of secondary picketing, is liable in damages, this provision 
seems to be broad enough to allow action in damages for the breach of 
a collective agreement. 
A question arises how the spécifie provisions of the Manitoba Act as 
amended providing for civil actions in damages for breach of a collective 
agreement would fit into the provisions of the same Act regarding com-
pulsory recourse to grievance procédure and final and binding seule-
ment, by arbitration or otherwise, of any différences between the parties 
to, or persons bound by, the collective agreement concerning its meaning, 
application or violation? Is there an inhérent conflict between thèse 
two sets of provisions? The answer seems to be in the négative. Section 
46A(2) refers to a party which « is in breach » of a collective agreement. 
Such a breach, unless it is self-evident as in the case of a union calling 
a strike during the life of a collective agreement, would hâve to be 
ascertained first through grievance procédure including arbitration as 
provided in the Act under Section 19. Once such breach is found by 
the arbitration board the injured party would hâve the right either to 
prosecute for an offence under the Act (with the consent in writing of 
the labour Relations Board) under Section 46(1) or to sue for damages 
under Section 46A(2) if damages were not dealt with by arbitration. 
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Similar procédure would be applicable under the British Columbia 
législation. A conflict would only arise if Section 46A(2) would grant 
the courts the right to ascertain whether a breach of collective agreement 
took place; then such provision would be in conflict with Section 19 
regarding the compulsory settlement of ail différences concerning the 
meaning, application or violation of a collective agreement, and the 
legislator did not make such a provision. 
This has been briefly the situation in the common law provinces 
regarding the status of trade unions and the status of collective agree-
ments on the eve of the introduction of Bill 54 in the Québec législature. 
PART III 
Before the Québec Labour Code was enacted three versions of Bill 
54 were introduced in the Québec Législature. 
The question is how, during the passage of the Act, the intention 
of the legislator was changing with regard to the status of trade unions 
and the status of collective agreements and how thèse matters were 
settled in the Code as enacted. 
The first version of Bill 54 was introduced in June 1963. The Bill 
defined in Section l(a) a trade union as follows : 
S. l ( a ) «association of employées» — a group of employées incor-
pora ted 6 4 as a professional syndicate, union, brotherhood 
or otherwise, having as its object the study, safeguarding and 
development of the économie, social and educational interests 
of its members and particularly the negotiation and applica-
tion of collective agreements ; 
Section l(b) and (c) defined « certified » and « recognized » asso-
ciations : 
S. l ( b ) «certified association» — the association recognized by 
décision of the Board as the représentative of afl or some 
of the employées of an employer ; 
( c ) « recognized association » — an association which 65 is not 
certified but has made a collective agreement with an em-
ployer or is otherwise recognized by him as the représent-
ative of ail or some of his employées ; 
( 64 ) In the second version of the Bill the word « incorporated » in the English 
text was changed into « constituted ». 
(65) In the second version of the Bill the wording of this définition in the 
English text was slightly changed : 
( c ) « recognized association » — an association which, although not certified, 
has made a collective agreement with an employer or is otherwise re-
cognized by him as the représentative of ail or some of his employées. 
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The définition of a trade union contained in Sec. l(a) although not 
identical in terms with the définition contained in Sec. 2(d) of the Labour 
Relations Act, is however, basically similar. It includes both the unions 
incorporated as professional syndicates and unincorporated unions, the 
former being légal entities and the latter voluntary associations without 
a légal personality of their own. 
A new provision which had a direct effect on the status of some of 
the bona fide unincorporated unions was contained in Section 38 which 
read : 
S. 38. Any certifiée! or recognized association of employées, even 
if not incorporated, shall hâve the capacity to exercise in its name 
ail its rights and recourses under this code or any collective agree-
ment. 
The wording of Section 38 implied that a « certified » or « recogn-
ized » trade union would hâve légal status similar to incorporated unions 
however restricted to the exercise of rights and recourses under the code 
or collective agreements. In this way the status of a voluntary associ-
ation within the context of Section l(a) would be restricted to unincor-
porated unions which are neither « certified » nor « recognized ». 
The wording of Section 38 did not seem to restrict this contemplated 
légal status to the proceedings before the Labour Relations Board or a 
Council of Arbitration, or before an Arbitration Board in grievance 
procédure under a collective agreement, but would also include any 
court proceedings such as, prosecutions under the Act arising from the 
breach of the Labour Code or collective agreement; the exécution by 
court action of the awards of council of arbitration or of arbitration 
awards under collective agreement; further, « certified » or « recogn-
ized » unions would hâve légal personality in civil proceedings in con-
nection with prérogative writs and injunctions. However, Section 38 
could not contemplate civil actions for settling grievances or other 
disputes during the life of a collective agreement in view of the provisions 
of the Code for settling of grievances by final and binding arbitration 
and for settling of other disagreements during the life of collective agree-
ment by the way as provided in the collective agreement. If Section 38 
was meant simply a procédural device that would enable the unions to 
appear in courts without affecting their status, this section would be 
superfluous so far as civil proceedings are concerned in view of Art. 
81(a) and 81(b) of the Code of Civil Procédure66 which provided for 
(66) (1959-60) Ch. 99. 
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suits against or by unincorporated unions, and in view of Chapter VIII 
(Penalties) of the Bill and in particular of Sections 131 and 13367 in case 
of prosecution. Consequently, Section 38 meant that « certified » or 
« recognized » trade unions even if not incorporated were supposed to 
be endowed with the status of légal entities, however restricted to the 
rights and recourses under the Code and collective agreements. 
The Bill defined in Section l(e) a collective agreement in the 
following terms : 
( e ) « collective agreement » — an agreement in writing respecting 
conditions of employment made between one or more associations of 
employées and one or more employers or employers' associations ; 
This définition is similar to that contained in Section 2(e) of the 
Labour Relations Act and reflects the approach to the collective agree-
ment as something in the nature of a gentlemen's agreement, and not 
enforceable through civil litigations. However it should be noted that 
the définition of collective agreement contained in the code mentions 
that the agreement should be in writing and also as the parties to the 
agreement it mentions the unions as such and not the représentatives of 
the union as it was said in the définition of the collective agreement in 
the Labour Relations Act. Further, the Bill added a new provision 
which the Labour Relations Act did not contain, namely, Section 50 in 
the first paragraph reads : 
S. 50. The collective agreement may contain any provision respect-
ing conditions of employment which is not contrary to public order 
or prohibited by law. 
A somewhat similar provision was contained in the second paragraph 
of the définition of collective agreement in Section 21 of the Professional 
Syndicates' Act which refers to « the conditions of labour not prohibited 
by law » that may form the object of a collective agreement. But, signi-
ficantly, the close resemblance is to the part of the Québec Civil Code 
which lists among the requisites to the validity of a contract the following 
requisite in Art. 990; 
The considération is unlawful when it is prohibited by law, or is 
contrary to good morals or public order. 
(67) S. 131. Any pénal prosecution under this code may be taken by the Board 
or by any interested party with the written authorization of the Board or the consent 
of the Attorney General. 
S. 133. Any employer or association may be represented for the purposes 
of this code, by duly empowered représentatives. 
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Also the Bill contained in Sections 55 and 56 (the same Sections in 
the Code as enacted) provisions similar to those we find in other juris-
dictions but not provided in the Labour Relations Act, regarding the 
binding force of the collective agreements. Section 55 stated : 
A collective agreement made by a certifiée! or recognized association 
shall be binding upon ail the présent or future employées contemp-
lated by the certification or récognition. 
Section 56 ; 
A collective agreement made by an employers' association shall be 
binding upon ail employers who are members of such association and 
to whom it can apply, including those who subsenquently become 
members thereof. 
It should be noted, that unlike other jurisdictions Section 55 refers 
to the binding force of a collective agreement upon the employées con-
templated by the certification or récognition but does not mention the 
union which is a party to the agreement. 
The implication of thèse provisions is that a breach of a collective 
agreement is an offence under the Code and subject to prosecution (with 
the consent of the Labour Relations Board or of the Attorney-General) 
and summary conviction. Normally such prosecution would be preceded 
by grievance procédure where the breach of the agreement would be 
established. 
The first version of the Bill contained also Section 57 which reads 
as follows : 
S. 57. The provisions of the collective agreement that are applicable 
to an employée shall pleno jure form part of lus individual contract 
of employment and, notwithstanding any vvaiver, he may claim the 
advantages thereof. 
The significance of this provision with regard to the status of 
collective agreements should be , considered in the light of the Privy 
Council's décision in Young v. Canadian Northern Railway Company.68 
The circumstances of that case as summarized in the headnote, were as 
follows. The appellant was verbally engagée! in 1920 by a railway 
company as a machinist at the « going rate » of wages. He was dismissed 
in 1927 on the ground of réduction of staff. He sued for wrongful dis-
missal, contending that a written agreement entered into by the railway 
company with a labour organization and called « Wage Agreement No. 
(68) (1931) A.C. 83. 
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4 », formed part of his contract of employment, and that under it the 
failway company could not dismiss him on a réduction in staff, as they 
had retained men junior to him. The agreement had been applied to 
the appellant (who was not a member of the organization) as to the 
amount of his wages, the notice given to him, and in other respects. 
The railway company stated that at the time they had applied the 
agreement to ail the men employed in their shops. 
The Privy Council held that Wage Agreement No. 4 did not form 
part of the individual contract for the employment of the appellant. The 
fact that the railway company applied it to him was done not because 
the company was bound contractually to apply it to the appellant but 
because as a matter of policy the company deemed it expédient to apply 
the agreement to ail the employées. Further, the Privy Council held 
that having regard to the terms and nature of the agreement it did not 
by itself constitute a contract between any individual employée and his 
employer; observance of its terms by an employer could not be enforced 
by action by any employée, not even by the labour organization concern-
ed, but only by calling a strike until the grievance was remedied. 
The Privy Council decided two things : 1) that a collective agree-
ment did not by itself constitute either a contract or part of the contract 
or part of the contract of employment between an employée and an 
employer and consequently such an agreement could not be enforced 
by a personal court action by the employée concerned; 2) a collective 
agreement was not a contract enforceable in court by the labour organ-
ization that was party to the agreement. 
The inference of this décision as pointed out by B. Lepkin 69 would 
be that the individual employée could bring suit on the ground of master 
and servant relationship for a breach of a collective agreement if the 
terms of the collective agreement by statutory provisions were meant 
to form a part of individual contract of employment. Then a collective 
agreement could be enforced indirectly by civil action of individual 
employées enforcing their individual contracts of employment. If this 
interprétation is correct then once the terms of the collective agreement 
applicable to the employées would form by the provisions of Section 57 
an intégral part of the individual contract of employment, an employée 
would hâve two ways of asserting his rights under collective agreement. 
(69) See, footnote 5. 
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Either he could use the grievance procédure under collective agreement, 
or he could disregard such procédure entirely and take his cause outside 
the Labour Code and endeavour to enforce his rights under collective 
agreement by personal action within the context of the master and 
servant realtionship under the Civil Code. In the second alternative, 
the courts would be ascertaining the rights and obligations resulting 
from a collective agreement as applicable to individual employées and 
such action would be in conflict with the provisions of the Labour Code 
regarding the compulsory way of settling the grievances under collective 
agreement outside the courts by way of compulsory and binding ar-
bitration. 
The intended Section 57 was a departure from the established 
relationship between collective agreements and individual contracts of 
employment as described by Mr. Justice Judson of the Suprême Court 
of Canada in Le Syndicat Catholique des employés des Magasins de 
Québec Inc. v. La Compagnie Paquet Ltée70 in which case the validity 
of the Rand Formula in Québec was tested. Mr. Justice Judson describ-
ed the relationship between a collective agreement and individual con-
tract in the following way (at pp. 353-4) : 
The union is, by virtue of its incorporation under the Professional 
Syndicates' Act and its certification under the Labour Relations Act, 
the représentative of ail employées in the unit for the purpose of 
negotiating the labour agreement. There is no room left for private 
negotiation between employer and employée. Certainly to the extent 
of the matters covered by the collective agreement, freedom of 
contract between master and individual servant is abrogated. The 
collective agreement teUs the employer on tvhat terms ne must in 
the future conduct his master and servant relations. When this col-
lective agreement was mode, it then became the duty of the employer 
to modify his contracts of employment in accordance with its terms 
so far as the inclusion of those terms is authorized by the governing 
statutes. (italics added) 
How did this compulsory check-ofï of the équivalent of union dues 
become a terni of the individual employee's contract of employment ? 
They were told by the notice that in future this déduction would 
be a term of their contract of employment. 
and he added (at p. 355) : 
The union contracts not as agent or mandatory but as an independent 
contracting party and the contract it makes with the employer binds 
the employer to regulate his master and servant relations according 
to the agreed terms. (italics added). 
(70) (1959) 18 D.L.R. (2d) 346. 
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Thèse statements implied that collective agreements under Québec 
législation do not become, by opération of law, a part of individual 
contracts of employment. Being independent agreements between the 
unions and the employers, collective agreements détermine the terms 
which the employer and individual employées must observe if and when 
individual contacts of employment are entered into. 
The question whether such individual contacts of employment 
embodying the terms of a collective agreement could be enforced 
directly by individual employées in a court action on the basis of master 
and servant relationship without recourse to grievance procédure under 
collective agreement was considered by Chief Justice McRuer of the 
Ontario High Court in Re Grottoli v. Lock and Son Ltd.71 Relying on 
Mr. Justice Judson's judgment in the Paquet case, supra, the Chief 
Justice held that the common law relationship of employer and employée 
is not abrogated by reason of the existence of a collective agreement by 
whose terms the employment relationship is governed, nor does S. 34(1) 
of the Ontario Labour Relations Act (R.S.O. 1960, Ch. 202) requiring 
arbitration of collective agreement disputes, oblige an employée to resort 
to arbitration, to the exclusion of court action, to assert a claim against 
his employer for unpaid wages. Consequently, an employée could sue 
under his contact of employment in the ordinary courts to recover vac-
ation pay owed to him under the collective agreement. 
The proposed Code contained also Section 58 which in the Code as 
enacted became Section 57, and reads as follows : 
S. 58. A certifiée! or recognized association may exercise ail the 
recourses which the collective agreement grants to each employée 
whom it represents without being required to prove that the interested 
party as assigned his claim. 
The meaning of this provision is self explanatory and would apply 
to grievance procédure and to prosecutions under the Act. It would be 
applicable also in civil proceedings within the scope of Section 38 (parti-
cularly in suits in exécution of arbitration awards under collective 
agreements) and in this respect it would form an exception from Section 
81 of the Code of Civil Procédure which provides that « a person cannot 
use the name of another to plead ».72 Further, because of Section 38 a 
(71) (1963) 39 D.L.R. (2d) 128. 
(72) Section 58 is similar to Section 25 of the Professional Syndicates' Act but 
without the proviso contained therein, and to the powers of the Parity Committee 
under Section 20(a ) of the Collective Agreement Act. 
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certified or recognized union acting under Section 58 would hâve a légal 
personality of its own. 
Chapter IV, Division III of the Bill dealt with arbitration of grie-
vances in basically the same way (although differing in some détails) as 
provided in the Labour Relations Act. Section 88 provided that every 
« grievance » (which according to Section l(g) means «any disagreement 
respecting the interprétation or application of a collective agreernent ») 
that is a dispute concerning « rights », lias to be submitted to an ar-
bitration in the manner provided in the collective agreernent if it so 
provides «and the parties abide by it» (the last quoted words were added 
to the Section as enacted and the purpose of this addition is not clear); 
otherwise such a grievance would hâve to be referred to an arbitration 
officer choosen by the parties or failing agreernent appointed by the 
Minister. (The corresponding provision in the Labour Relations Act 
stated that, if the collective agreernent did not contain a provision 
regarding arbitration, the dispute had to be submitted to arbitration in 
the manner provided by the Québec Trade Disputes Act). 
Section 89 provided that the arbitration award shall be final and 
binding the parties and may be executed under the authority of a court 
of compétent jurisdiction at the suit of a party who shall not be obliged 
to implead the person for whose benefit he is acting. 
Finally, Section 90 provided that during the period of a collective 
agreernent any différence other than disagreements regarding the in-
terprétation or application of collective agreements (the so-called « in-
terest » disputes) shall be settled in the manner and to the erôent as 
provided in the agreernent.73 
(73) Arbitration of grievances. 
S. 88. Every grievance shall be submitted to arbitration in the manner provided 
in the collective agreernent if it so provides ; otherwise it shall be referred to an 
arbitration officer chosen by the parties or, failing agrément, appointed by the 
minister. 
S. 89. The arbitration awards shall be final and bind the parties. It may be 
executed in accordance with Sec. 81. 
S. 90. During the period of a collective agreernent, any différence other than a 
grievance within the meaning of Section 1 shall not be settled except in the manner 
provided in the agreernent and to the extent that th agreernent so provides. 
S. 81. The award shall hâve the effect of a collective agreernent signed by the 
parties. It may be executed under the authority of a court of compétent jurisdiction 
at the suit of a party who shall not be obliged to implead the person for whose 
benefit he is acting. 
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The provisions of the Bill regarding the final and binding arbitra-
tion of grievances and other disagreements during the life of collective 
agreement left no room for the settlement of such disagreements by 
civil litigations (unless an employée covered by a collective agreement 
would launch a civil action on the basis of his individual contract of 
employment under Section 57). Consequently Section 59 which provided 
that « rights and recourses arising out of a collective agreement or an 
award made in lieu thereof shall be prescribed by six months from the 
day when the cause of action arose », and that « recourse to the procé-
dure respecting grievances shall interrupt prescription », would apply in 
cases of prosecutions under the Code for breach of collective agreement 
or of an award made in lieu of collective agreement by a council of 
arbitration. Further, it would apply in suits for exécution of arbitration 
awards under grievance procédure and for exécution of awards made 
by councils of arbitration, and in proceedings in connection with préro-
gative writs and injunctions. There would be no application of Section 
59 in case of disagreements during the life of collective agreements 
because the first version of the bill did not provide for settling of such 
disagreements by civil litigation. 
Penalty provisions in the Bill dealing with offences under the Code 
are similar to those contained in the Labour Relations Act and prosecu-
tions by or against trade unions or employers or any other person for 
an offence under the Code including a breach of a collective agreement 
as ruled in the course of grievance procédure or for not abiding with 
the décision of the Labour Relations Board may be brought about 
pursuant to the Québec Summary Convictions Act. Any pénal prose-
cution under the code may be taken by the Board or by any interested 
party with the consent of the Board or the consent of the Attorney 
General (S. 131). S. 133 provided that « any employer or association 
may be represented, for the purposes of this code, by duly empowered 
représentatives ». It seems that Section 38 added a new dimension to 
the prosecutions under the code. A prosecution by or against a certified 
or recognized union for breach of the Code or any collective agreement 
would be in the union's name and for the purpose of such prosecution 
the union in question would hâve légal entity. 
The second version of Bill 54 was introduced in the Québec légis-
lature in January 1964. Among the changes brought in the second 
version was the inclusion of a new Section 54 which changed entirely 
the status of collective agreements, the way of enforcing such agreements 
and affected the status of unions under the Code. Section 54 read: 
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A collective agreement shall give rise to ail the rights and recourses 
provided by law for the enforcement or obligations. 
The wording of Section 54 abandoned the approach to collective 
agreements as being of the nature of « gentlemen's agreements » which 
basically was the approach of the Québec Labour Relations Act and 
of the first version of the Labour Code, and made collective agreements 
civil contacts enforceable in courts. Under Section 54 any disagree-
ment under collective agreement could be brought directly before the 
courts in disregard of the provisions of the Act regarding arbitration of 
grievances and a union could sue or be sued for damages for breach 
of the collective agreement. 
The inclusion of Section 54 enlarged the scope of application of 
Section 38. A « certifîed » or « recognized » union would also hâve the 
status of légal entity for the purpose of enforcement through civil actions 
of rights and obligations arising out of the collective agreement. Sec-
tion 54 would add civil litigations to the scope of the application of 
Section 58 (S. 57 in the code as enacted) which entitles the union to 
exercise ail recourses which the collective agreement grants to each 
employée whom it represents without being required to prove the assign-
ment of claims and to — the application of Section 59 dealing with pres-
cription. 
The provisions of Section 54 were not entirely new to the Québec 
labour législation and as already noted, similar provisions had been 
inserted in Section 24 of the Professional Syndicales' Act. Also it should 
be recalled that the Professional Syndicates' Act was concerned with 
trade unions when incorporated under the Act as légal entities and also 
the same Act stated that a collective agreement made by such an incor-
porated union under the Act was a contact. As the Professional Syn-
dicates* Act did not provide either for grievance procédure or for 
compulsory and binding arbitration of disputes under collective agree-
ment, it was within the législative logic that the only way enforcing 
a collective agreement which was a contact was by a court action for 
enforcement of contractual obligation. 
The incongruity of the intended solution by inserting Section 54 in 
the Bill resulted from the fact that basically the approach taken by the 
Labour Code towards the status of trade unions and status and enforce-
ment of collective agreements was not that of the Professional Syndi-
cates* Act but that of the Labour Relations Act. Once the Bill, following 
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the Labour Relations Act, provided for grievance procédure and for 
final and binding arbitration of disputes during the life of collective 
agreement, Section 54 was in conflict with thèse provisions by allowing 
the same disputes to be brought directly before the courts. 
On the other hand one can see some reasons why Section 54 was 
inserted in the Bill. The définition of trade union in the Code (Sec. 
l(a) ) included both incorporated and unincorporated unions. Section 
38, by providing that any certified or recognized association of em-
ployées, even if not incorporated, shall hâve the capacity to exercise in 
its name ail its rights and recourses under the code or any collective 
agreement, granted to unincorporated but certified or recognized unions 
a légal status for the purpose of the Code and the légal proceedings 
based on the Code or a collective agreement. 
Section 57, by providing that the terms of the collective agreement 
applicable to an employée should by opération of law, form part of his 
individual contract of employment, and by giving him the right to 
enforce the terms of collective agreement through court action, posed 
the question why in those circumstances the collective agreement as 
such should not be a contract between the union and the employer 
enforceable in courts directly by the parties to the agreement. 
Although the définition of a collective agreement in Section l(e) 
did not define the collective agreement as a contract, however it provided 
that the agreement should be in writing and mentioned unions as such 
as parties to the agreement. Further, Section 50 dealing with the con-
tents of a collective agreement included limitations remi&iscent to 
limitations contained in the Civil Code with regard to contracts. 
There is a link between the status of unions and the status of col-
lective agreements and once the Bill by Section 38 granted unincorpo-
rated unions (but certified or recognized) légal entity for the purposes 
of the Code, the logic of législative reasoning and the reality of labour-
management relations might hâve lead those who drafted the Code to 
the conclusion contained in Section 54 making collective agreements 
civil contracts enforceable in courts. Also, those who drafted the Code 
were no doubt aware of the évolution of the common law and of statu-
tory enactments in some jurisdictions with regard to the status of unions 
and collective agreement and by inserting Sections 38 and 54 they 
embodied in statutory provisions the trend already visible in the deci-
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sions of the courts and in statutory enactments (like S. 46A of the Mani-
toba Act) that a trade union is a légal entity and a collective agreement 
is a contract and that the obligations of the parties under the agreement 
are contractual obligations. 
Although Section 54 might hâve been a logical conséquence of 
Section 38 and Section 57 its inclusion meant a clash of two basic 
philosophies of labour management relations. On the one hand the 
Code reflected the spécifie traditional nature of those relations based 
on the assumption that the unincorporated union is not a légal entity, 
the collective agreement is not a contract and that ail disputes related 
to the opération of collective agreements hâve to be settled out of courts 
by grievance and arbitration procédure under the Code and collective 
agreements. And, on the other hand by inserting in the fîrst version 
Section 38 and particularly with Section 54 in the second version the 
authors of the Code were implying a différent philosophy of labour 
management relations, namely, that the union is a légal entity, when 
certified or recognized, that a collective agreement is a contract and 
like any other contract it gives rise to rights and obligations which 
may be enforced directly in courts including actions for damages. Ac-
tually those who drafted the Code made an attempt to bring together 
two différent concepts of the nature of trade unions and of the nature 
of collective agreements as reflected respectively in the Labour Relations 
Act and in the Professional Syndicates' Act. 
By adding Section 54 to the provisions of the Code regarding arbi-
tration of grievances and attempt was made to combine the settlement 
of disputes under collective agreements by arbitration with the settle-
ment of such disputes by the courts and, because of the inhérent incon-
gruity of thèse two ways of settlement, the attemps failed. 
How this emerging new concept of the status of unions and of 
collective agreements would fit into the traditional concept of enforcing 
collective agreements by grievance procédure and final and binding 
arbitration has still to be thought through. One of the ways of solving 
this problem is indicated by Section 46A of the Manitoba Act which 
seems to open court action not for the considération of disputes under 
collective agreement which are left to be settled by arbitration, but 
for actions in damages once, as the resuit of arbitration, a breach of 
collective agreement had been established. 
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In the third version of the Bill, introduced by the Québec Govern-
ment in July 1964, Sections 38 and 54 and 57 were abandoned and the 
Code as enacted does not contain them. The resuit is that with regard 
to the status of unions which are not incorporated and with regard 
to the status of collective agreements, the Québec Labour Code returned 
basically to the position of the Labour Relations Act as enacted in 1944 
with subséquent amendments. This means that the trade unions in 
Québec, whén not incorporated under the Professional Syndicates' Act, 
hâve the status of voluntary associations without personaHty of their 
own, and the collective agreements, although their status has been 
strenghtened particularly by provisions of SS. 55 and 56 are not contracts 
enforceable in courts. This leaves Québec labour législation behind the 
présent évolution of common law as reflected in the judicial décisions 
(including the Suprême Court of Canada) and behind statutory enact-
ments in some provinces regarding status of unions and the status of 
collective agreements. 
This conclusion with regard to the status of trade unions in the 
Code as enacted, is not affected by the fact that the Code maintained 
Section 58 of the first and second versions of the Bill but now as Section 
57 regarding thé right of certified or recognized unions to exercise the 
recourses which the collective agreement grants to each employée. By 
abandoning Section 38 and Section 54 the unions in question may exer-
cise thèse recourses not as légal entities any more but as voluntary 
associations in the way open to such associations in case of prosecution 
by the provisions of the Code regarding prosecutions, and in case of 
civil proceedings (prérogative writs, exécution of arbitration awards) 
in the way as provided by Sections 81(a) and 81(b) of the Code of Civil 
Procédure. 
The Code as enacted added a new Section 58 which reads: 
S. 58. The recourse of several employées against the same employer 
may be cumulated in a single demand and the total claimed shall 
détermine the competency of the court of original jurisdiction as 
well as of appeal. 
This provision is similar to Section 53 of the Collective Agreement 
Act74 and it would fînd application in suits in exécution of arbitration 
awards under the grievance procédure and in actions outside collective 
agreements based on individual contracts between employées and em-
ployer. 
(74) R.S.Q. 1941, Ch. 163. 
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In conclusion, the problem of status of unions and of collective 
agreements in the Québec Labour Code can be summed up m the 
following way. 
The first version of the Bill, while basically maintaining the position 
of the Labour Relations Act that collective agreements are not contracts, 
granted to « certified » or « recognized » unions the status of légal en-
tities of their own for the purposes of the Code and collective agree-
ments. This would enable, besides the unions incorporated under the 
Professional Syndicates* Act, the « certified » or « recognized » unions 
to prosecute in their own name as légal entities for breaches of the Code 
or of a collective agreement and to hâve the same status in such pro-
ceedings as in connection with prérogative writs, injunctions and in 
actions in exécution of arbitration awards under grievance procédure 
and of awards of councils of arbitration. Only the unions which were 
neither incorporated under the Professional Syndicates* Act, nor « cer-
tified » or « recognized » would remain voluntary associations without 
légal status of their own. Such a situation would be an advance when 
compared with the Québec Labour Relations Act under which ail 
unions, except those incorporated under the Professional Syndicates' 
Act, were voluntary associations without légal status of their own. 
The second version of the Bill, by adding to Section 38 Section 54, 
enlarged the status of « certified » or « recognized » unions undex Sec-
tion 38 by making them also able to sue or be sued as légal entities to 
enforce the rights and obligations under collective agreements. Section 
54 by making collective agreements civil contracts enforceable in courts, 
was in conflict with the provisions of the Bill regarding compulsory 
settlement of disputes under collective agreements by arbitration. 
The third version of the Bill and the Code as enacted by aban-
doning Sections 38 and 54, returned to the concept embodied in the 
Québec Labour Relations Act that ail unions (except those incorporated 
under the Professional Syndicates* Act) are voluntary associations 
without status of their own and that collective agreements are not con-
tracts enforceable in courts. 
LE CODE DU TRAVAIL DU QUÉBEC ET LE STATUT DES 
SYNDICATS ET DES CONVENTIONS COLLECTIVES 
Avant la passation du Code du Travail du Québec, les principales dispositions 
affectant le statut des syndicats et des conventions collectives au Québec étaient 
L E CODE DU TRAVAIL DU QUÉBEC ET LE STATUT DES SYNDICATS ET.. . 275 
contenues dans la loi des Relations ouvrières et dans celle des Syndicats profession-
nels. En vertu de la loi des Syndicats professionnels, un syndicat ouvrier pouvait 
acquérir une personnalité légale en suivant la procédure appropriée. Une conven-
tion collective signée par un tel syndicat constituait un contrat négocié librement 
entre l'employeur et le syndicat ouvrant des recours devant les tribunaux et liant 
seulement les employés qui en étaient membres ou qui l'avaient joint plus tard. 
La loi des Syndicats professionnels ne contenait pas de dispositions touchant le 
règlement des conflits pendant la durée de la convention collective par une procé-
dure de griefs ou par l'arbitrage à sentence exécutoire. 
Dans le contexte de la loi des Relations ouvrières, les syndicats (non incorporés 
en vertu de la loi des Syndicats professionnels) étaient des associations volontaires 
sans personnalité légale propre. Les conventions collectives signées par de tels 
syndicats n'étaient pas des contrats librement négociés donnant droit de recours 
devant les tribunaux, mais s'apparentaient à la nature des «gentlemen's agreements» 
conclus par les employeurs et les syndicats certifiés comme agents de négociation 
et liant non seulement les membres du syndicat mais tous les employés de l'unité 
de négociation. Les employeurs devaient négocier de bonne foi avec des agents de 
négociation certifiés. La loi des Relations ouvrières ne prévoyait pas le règlement 
devant les tribunaux des griefs relevant des conventions collectives, mais l'amende-
ment de 1961 à la Loi prévoyait l'arbitrage obligatoire et à sentence exécutoire de 
ces griefs. 
Le seul recours judiciaire devant les tribunaux inclus dans la Loi était une 
poursuite de caractère pénal en vertu de la loi des convictions sommaires du Québec 
pour infractions aux dispositions de la Loi. Depuis 1946, les dispositions de la loi 
des Relations ouvrières en regard de la nature et de l'application des conventions 
collectives s'appliquèrent aux conventions collectives conclues par les syndicats 
incorporés en vertu de la loi des Syndicats professionnels et certifiés comme agents 
négociateurs en vertu de la loi des Relations ouvrières. En 1938, une loi pour 
faciliter l'exercice de certains droits rendit possible le recours devant les tribunaux 
contre des syndicats non incorporés en leur propre nom. Ces dispositions furent 
ajoutées à l'amendement de 1960 au Code de procédure civile en permettant aux 
syndicats non incorporés de poursuivre en leur nom collectif. 
Alors que ces amendements fournissaient une procédure qui permettait aux 
syndicats non-incorporés de poursuivre ou d'être poursuivis en leur nom, elle n'af-
fectait pas la position des syndicats non-incorporés en tant qu'associations volon-
taires sans personnalité légale. 
En régime de common law, les syndicats ouvriers comme tels avaient été con-
sidérés sans existence ni personnalité légale distincte de leurs membres individuels 
et conséquemment ils étaient exemptés des procédures judiciaires en leur propre 
nom. Les conventions collectives d'après le common law n'avaient pas été consi-
dérées comme contrats ouvrant des recours devant les tribunaux, mais plutôt s'ap-
parentaient à des « gentlemen's agreements ». Cette approche en common law 
relativement au statut des syndicats et des conventions collectives s'est reflétée 
dans la législation patronale-ouvrière qui apparût dans les années qui suivirent la 
deuxième guerre-mondiale dans le domaine de juridiction fédérale aussi bien que 
dans la législation provinciale en common law. En même temps, en ce qui con-
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cerne le statut des syndicats ouvriers, certaines lois ont prévu d'accorder aux syn-
dicats une personnalité légale afin qu'ils puissent être poursuivis en leur propre 
nom pour les offenses commises contre les Lois. En conséquence les tribunaux 
prétendaient que ces dispositions ne pouvaient pas être interprétées comme per-
mettant également aux syndicats de poursuivre en leur nom. 
En conséquence, la loi des Relations ouvrières fut amendée au Manitoba et au 
Nouveau-Brunswick afin d'habiliter les syndicats à poursuivre comme entités légales. 
Dans la plupart des juridictions, la législation ouvrière n'indiquait pas si les syn-
dicats étaient capables de poursuivre ou d'être poursuivis en leur nom en tant que 
personnes légales. La présomption était à l'effet que les syndicats ouvriers étant 
des associations volontaires, la seule possibilité qui leur restait de poursuivre ou 
d'être poursuivis en justice était par la voie d'une action représentative. Dans 
quelques cas, cette vue fut confirmée par les tribunaux. Dans plusieurs autres 
cependant, les tribunaux considèrent les syndicats comme des entités légales en 
regard des lois de Relations ouvrières et des procédures judiciaires découlant de 
ces lois. Finalement, dans la cause, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, local 
No. 213, vs Henri Thérien (1960) 22 D.L.R. (2d) p. 1, la Cour Suprême du Canada 
soutint qu'un syndicat ouvrier, en vertu de la loi des Relations ouvrières de la Co-
lombie-Britannique, est une entité légale non seulement en regard de la loi des 
Relations ouvrières, mais aussi du common law et peut être tenu responsable en 
son nom pour dommages, soit pour aller à l'encontre d'une disposition de la loi des 
Relations ouvrières, soit en vertu du common law. 
Dans quelques décisions qui suivirent ce jugement, les tribunaux prétendirent 
que le principe établi lors de la cause Thérien était applicable aux syndicats ou-
vriers en vertu de la législation ouvrière au Manitoba, en Ontario et en vertu de 
la loi fédérale I.R.D.I. Cette évolution du common law en regard du statut des 
syndicats s'est reflétée dans des dispositions légales dans quelques provinces. L'ap-
proche originelle du common law qui apparentait les conventions collectives à des 
« gentlemen^ agreements » s'est changée à la suite des dispositions légales concer-
nant le caractère exécutoire des conventions collectives, la méthode de faire appli-
quer de telles conventions par l'arbitrage obligatoire et à sentence exécutoire, et en 
raison des dispositions qui faisaient d'une infraction à la convention une offense 
en vertu de la Loi et objet de poursuite. Ceci amena les tribunaux (incluant la 
Cour Suprême du Canada) dans la cause Polymer Corporation and OU Chemical 
Atomic Workers International Union, Local 16-14 (1961), 26 D.LR. (2d) 609; (1961) 
28-D.L.R. (2d) 81; (1962) 33-D.L.R. (2d) 124; d'appuyer la position prise par le 
tribunal d'arbitrage formé en vertu de la convention collective à l'effet que pour 
les fins de l'arbitrage une convention collective est un contrat et que le tribunal 
pouvait octroyer des dommages-intérêts pour infraction à une convention collec-
tive, même si un tel pouvoir n'était pas explicitement inclus dans la convention. 
L'Amendement de 1962 à la loi des Relations ouvrières du Manitoba établit spéci-
fiquement qu'une infraction à une convention collective est passible d'une poursuite 
pour dommages-intérêts devant les tribunaux. 
Avant la passation du Code du Travail du Québec, trois versions du bill 54 
furent présentées à la Législature québécoise. La première version du bill défi-
nissait un syndicat d'une façon fondamentalement semblable à la définition conte-
nue dans la loi des Relations ouvrières. La définition incluait à la fois les syndicats 
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incorporés comme syndicats professionnels et les syndicats non-incorporés, les pre-
miers étant des entités légales et les derniers des associations volontaires. Cepen-
dant, le Bill ajoutait une nouvelle disposition (S. 38) par laquelle un syndicat 
« accrédité » ou « reconnu » devait posséder une personnalité légale quoique res-
treinte à l'exercice des droits et recours selon le Code du Travail ou toute conven-
tion collective. En conséquence, le statut d'associations volontaires devait être 
restreint aux syndicats non-incorporés n'étant pas « certifiés » ni « reconnus ». 
La définition de convention collective était semblable à celle contenue dans la loi 
des Relations ouvrières et reflétait l'approche selon laquelle une convention collec-
tive ressemblait à un « gentlemen's agreement », et non à un contrat donnant re-
cours devant les tribunaux. Le Bill contenait des dispositions concernant le carac-
tère exécutoire des conventions collectives qui considérait une infraction à de telles 
conventions comme une offense en vertu du Code et pouvant faire l'objet de pour-
suites et de convictions sommaires. La première version du bill prévoyait aussi 
que les dispositions de la convention collective applicables à un employé feraient 
partie pleno jure de son contrat individuel d'emploi et que l'employé pouvait ré-
clamer les avantages de telles dispositions (S. 57). Cette disposition devait per-
mettre aux employés de faire valoir leurs griefs en vertu des conventions collectives 
directement devant les tribunaux et conséquemment cette disposition venait en 
conflit avec les dispositions du Code concernant le mode obligatoire de règlement 
des griefs en vertu de la convention collective en dehors des tribunaux par voie 
d'arbitrage obligatoire et à sentence exécutoire. 
La seconde version du bill 54 prévoyait qu'« une convention collective donne 
ouverture à tous les droits et recours prévus par la loi pour la sanction des obliga-
tions. » 
Le libellé de la section 54 impliquait l'abandon de l'approche qui apparentait 
les conventions collectives à des « gentlemen's agreements » et qui était fondamen-
talement celle de la loi des Relations ouvrières et de la première version du Code, 
et qui rendait les conventions collectives des contrats civils permettant recours de-
vant les tribunaux. La section 54 venait en conflit avec les dispositions concernant 
l'arbitrage obligatoire et à sentence exécutoire des conflits en vertu des conventions 
collectives. 
La troisième version du Bill laissait tomber les sections 38, 54 et 57; en con-
séquence le Code ainsi adopté retournait au concept contenu dans la loi des Rela-
tions ouvrières du Québec à l'effet que tous les syndicats (exceptés ceux incorporés 
en vertu de la loi des Syndicats professionnels) sont des associations volontaires sans 
statut propre et que les conventions collectives ne constituent pas des contrats 
donnant recours devant les tribunaux. 
